Abstract: Standard economic theory does not capture trust a mong anonymous Internet tra ders. But w hen traders are allowed to have social preferences , u ncertainty about a seller's morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers' intrinsic m otivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain tra d e w hen not complemented by a feedb ack system. We demons trate that it is the interac tion of sodal preferences and cleverly designed reputa tion mechanisms that solves to a large extent the trust problern on Internet market platforms . How ever, economic theory and sodal preference mo dels te nd to underestimate the difficulties of promoting trust in anonymous online trading communities.
Introduction: Trust on Inte rnet M arket Platforms
In a traditional m a rket place, trust plays little role in t he exch ange of a good of recognizable quality. Being physically t ogether in time and space allows buyers to insp ect the item b efore b uying, a n d permits a 'simultaneous' exch ange of mon ey a nd object . T he sit uation is quite different in com p uter-mediated online market s su ch as eBay's a uction house a n d Amazon's ma rke t platform for used b ooks. Tra nsactions on these pla tforms a re ch a rac terized by asy nch ron aus (sequential) action s of anony mous t r aders, op erating at spatially disperse locations. In su ch a setting, trust b ecomes a critical issu e.
It is not just t h e scattering of t rad e in space a nd timethat pose ach allenge to Internet excha n ge, it is also t h e m edium of communication per se. Computermedia ted communication m akes it m ore difficult to sign al t r ustworth iness and to promot e cooper a tion than 'rich er ' communication mediasuch as face-to-face communication (Fra nk 1988; Brosig et al. 2003) . Trading via comp uter n etworks also allows b uyer s and seller s to freely choose a trader identity, d ifferent from on e's true ' offline ident ity', tha t can b e ch anged, often with ease. In add ition, lasting person al rela tionships on Internet ma r ket p latfor ms are infr equent; unlike in tradition al market environments, on e-sh ot interaction is the r ule rat her tha n the exception (R esnick/Zeckhauser 2002) . Thus, cyberspace m a kes it p articula rly difficult to develop social and econ omic bonding that supports t h e emergen ce of t rust a n d trust worthiness in more t raditional markets.
To deal with the problem, many online market platforms implement electronic reputation mechanisms that collect, process, and distribute large amounts of information about past trading activities of the market participants. These reputation mechanisms attempt to emulate traditional word-of-mouth networks and thus promote trust and trustworthiness among strangers. On eBay 's 'feedback forum', for instance, market pa rticipants continuously assess and reassess their transaction partners. Figure 1 provides a sample of t he type of feedback that is left on the site. Each user's assessment is made public and so forms his individual reputation that others can condition their beh avior on. As eBay's faunder Pierre Omidyar writes in a letter to all users:
"By creating an op en market that encourages honest dealin gs, I hope to make it easier to conduct business with strangers over the net. Most people are honest. And they mean well. Some p eople go out of their way to make things right. I've heard great st ories about the honesty of people here. But some people are dishonest. Or deceptive .... It's a fact of life. But here, those people can't hide. We'll drive them away. Protect others from them. This gr and hop e depends on your active participation. Becom e a r egist ered user. Use our Feedback Forum. Give praise wh ere it is due; make comp laints wh ere appropriate." http:/ fpages .ebay.com/ community / newsj founders-letter .html
In this paper, we describe a simple experimental game t hat capt ures the key problems of trust and trustworthiness on Internet market platforms from an economics point of view. We present n ew experime nts a nd survey oth er evidence indicating why and when people do or do n ot trust. We also compare the empirical evidence with economic theories of decision makin g and institutional design. The two critical findings from this work that we will emphasize are, first, t hat understanding trust and trustwort hy behavior requires us to consider a mix of huma n motives, no one motive being sufficient, a nd second, that t h e expr ession of these motives is sensitive to the institutional and strategic environment. The important implication is that trust and trustworthy behavior is n eit h er wholly a matter of social norms and m orality, as it is sometimes popularly assumed, nor entirely a matter of institutional design, as economists sometimes assume. Understanding how trust a nd trustworthiness is, and can be, sustained in an environment like the Internet will require a coming to grips with t he interplay b et ween the two.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we m otivate and describe the game. In section 3, we analyze one-sh ot encounters of t he game from the point in Chri stie's and Sotheby 's auction h ou ses, transactions among p rivate indiv iduals conducted on online market platforrns such as eBay and Am.azon are typically n ot secured; that is, eBay and Amazon n either attest to the cr e dibility of the private sellers nor do they guarantee item quality. A lso, selling on the Intem et is typically cheap, so that signaling trustworthlness through 'fancy store fronts' is not possible (although fancy homepages or elab orat ely designed offers may weil signal professional commitment and compet ence) . Finally, formal contr acting and legal enforcement is m ore costly (at least relative t o t h e item's value) than in traditional markets. of view of recent b ehavioral theories that seek to explain wh en t rust a nd trustworthy b ehavior w ill arise. In section 4, we fo cus on instit ution al explan a tions of how trust a nd t rustworthiness can b e created even if t r aders are ultimately guided by their material self-interest; these explana tions all pivot on r epeated encounters. Section 5 summarizes the findings.
The Trust Dilemma
Typically, in online trading, a seller p osts an offer on the market platform t h at includes a description of the item and its condition, a nd a price at wh ich h e is w illing to sell. Then, a w illing buyer sends the m oney to the seller. F inally, upon receiving the money, the seller is supposed to ship the it em to t h e buyer. 2 With n o outside control, h aving received the mon ey, the seller can profit from n ot sending the item or sending p oorer quality than promised. Anticipating t his moral hazard, buyers may n ot b e w illing to buy. As a consequ ence, t r ading that would m a ke everybody b etter off would n ot take place. This is t he essential trust dilemma tha t online m a rket s need navigate. The game-tree in figure 2 captures this dilemma (for the mome nt , ignore the number in t he bracket s) .
Both the selle r and the buyer are endowed w ith 35, which is t h e p ayoff when no trade t akes place. The seller offer s a n ite m for sale at a price of 35 wh ich h as a value of 50 t o t h e buyer. The seller's cost of p roviding t h e buyer w it h the item-ccsts associated with executing the trade, shipping, handling, as weil as production costs-is 20. So each succassfully completed trade creates a consumer surplus of 15 and a net profit of 15 for the seller. If the buyer chocses to buy the item, he sends 35 to the seller, who then has to decide whether toship the item. If the seller does not ship, he receives the price plus his endowment of 35 for a total of 70. If he ships, he receives the price minus the ccsts plus his endowment for a total of 50. If the buyer chooses not to buy the item, no trade occurs. The game captures the critical features of online trade. First, traders move sequentially because they are dispersed in space and time. Second, the seller's pecuniary motive dictates to keep the money along with his endowment and to not ship the item. In this case, the buyer would lose his endowment and end up with nothing. If the buyer anticipates that the seller does not ship, he will not buy and thus no transactionwill take place. This is the prediction of economic theory assuming that traders are only guided by pecuniary concerns. Third, interaction is anoeymous. In particular, the name attached to the seller does not reveal information about his trustworthiness.
3 Fourth, the trust-game is one-shot, meaning that there is no common history or common future among traders that could give them the opportunity to reward or punish each other for past behavior or to develop other kinds of social or economic bonding with each other. (As we will see later, however, even one-shot interactions can be strategically linked via information flows.) And fifth, since legal enforcement is typically too expensive to be a credible threat, prosecution when the item is not shipped is not an option in the game. 4 In the next sections, we discuss experimental evidence using the basic trust game as a vehicle for studying t r ust and trustworthiness.
Trust in One-Shot Games: Behavioral Explanations

The Nature of Trust ( a) Distributional aspects
From the p oint of v iew of economic analysis, one can h ard ly t hink abou t a m ore trust-unfriendly environment tha n online market platforms; yet , m any of t hese platforms flourish. So what makes these platforms work? One possible answer is that our basic trust game does accurately describe the m a rket institution but that p eople behave in a different way than the economic a nalysis su ggest s . In particular, it is sometimes a rgued that people are not as selfish as economists typically assume, a nd that traders care about morals. In fact , in t rust games and related anonymaus one-shot games (like the prisoner's dilemma gam e and the ultimaturn game), psychologists, sociologists, exp erimental econ om ists and oth ers h ave identified a couple of n on-pecuniary motives t hat m ay drive beh avior. Most prominently and actively discussed in the r ecen t economics liter atme are con cerns for fairness (Fehr/ Schmidt 1999; Bolton/ Ockenfels 2000) and r eciprocity (Rabin 1993 ; Dufwenberg/ Kirchsteiger forthcoming) . Some authors also p ut forward an individual concern for efficien cy (Ch a rness/ Rabin 2002).
All these social preference m odels assume t h at traders care about their own monetary payoff but tha t som e trad er s may additionally b e concerned wit h the social impact of their behavior. Reciprocity models conject ure t hat people tend to be kind in resp onse to kindness a nd unkind in resp onse to unkindness, while fairness m odels posit that som e individuals may h ave a pr efer ence for equitably sharing the efficiency gains from trade. That is, in our trust game, reciprocity mo dels su ggest tha t a seller ships because the buyer was so kind to b uy, wh er eas fairness models su ggest tha t he ships b ecause otherwise t he payoff distribution would be unfair. Models of efficiency striv ing behavior, fin ally, suggest t h at trader s care about the sum of payoffs. That is, a selle r in our t r ust game may ship b ecause this increases t he pie t o b e d ist r ibuted-independent of reciprocal a nd distributive fairness.
One important implication of all t h ese m od els is that it is not the buyers' social con cerns that drive the trading activities but t he sellers' social m otives. As lon g as the sellers a r e strictly selfish a nd rational, t h ere will be no shipping a nd thus no buying by rational buyers. Even a perfectly fair-minded buyer, alwa ys striv ing for equitable outcomes, would prefer 35 for both players over 70 for the seller a nd zer o for hirnself (this holds, e.g., r egardless of wheth er we apply Fehr and Schmidt's or Bolton and Ockenfels' m odel here) . Similarly, in reciprocity models, a buyer is only willing to buy if the seller reciprocates by shipping (again, this holds regardless of the specific reciprocity model) . F inally, a buyer con cerned about efficien cy cannot increase efficiency by sen din g mon ey to a seller w ho is unwilling to materialize the efficien cy gain by com pleting the trade. Thus, the only plausible reason to buy in our basic trust gameisthat the buyer sufficiently strongly believes that the seller will ship. B y this view, the preferences of the buyer are largely irrelevant: shipping in our basic trust game induces a selfish, a reciprocal, a fair-minded or an efficiency striving buyer to trust.
At first glance, the statement that trust is the belief t hat t he seller ships (wit h a sufficiently high probability) may sound like a trivial statement, bu t in fact it is highly sensitive to the details of the trust game. To see why, let us consider a very simplified 2-trader version of "ERC", the fairness model developed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . In this model, each trader i is motivated by his pecuniary income Yi (equivalent to the payoffs given at the end nodes of the trust game tree) but also prefers fair over unfair final p ayoff d istributions. A payoff distribution is perceived as unfair if a trader either earns more or less than the trading partner, that is, in the simplest form, if (Yi -Yj ) 2 > 0. 5 Traders motivated this way can be characterized by a 'motivation function' or u tilit y u;:
Utility is increasing in pecuniary income but decreasing in the in eq uality of income distribution. Not all traders suffer equally from unfai rness; t he parameter ri ;::: 0 measures the trade-off of trader i b etween the (som etimes) compet ing motives. Setting r i = 0 yields the standa rd economic m od el of complete selfishness. The distribution of Ti in the population is supposed to follow some cumulative distribution function F(ri).
In our basic trust game, a buyer i will only trust if h is expected payoff from (-70) 2 ), is larger t h an h is cer tain payoff from not trusting, 35, where p is the proba bility that a trusted seller will ship. Equivalently, the condition for trust is:
Tha t is, buyer i is only willing to buy if shipping is likely (p is large) and if
h e is sufficie ntly selfish, tha t is, if ri is sufficiently small. Why ? The buyer can avoid being exploited by the seller by not buying the item. Thus, if fai rness (or exploitation aversion) is the main motive, he should not buy. He will only run the risk of b eing exploited a nd buy the item when the exp ected material gain of trade is sufficiently la rge, and if he is sufficiently m otivated by t h e material gain r ela tive to his inequity aver sion. In other words, in our b asic trust game, pecuniary motives drive trust. Buying is motiva ted by t rust in sh ipping, n ot by n on-pecuniary incentives.
While the simple model we present h ere over simplifies cer tain com plexities (and the ge neral ERC model addresses some of these complex ities), it sharply 5 The gen eral ERC model assUines that a trader m ay care ab out his own r elative standing in a r eferen ce gr oup , but the model formulation we u se h er e works equally weil in t his particular Ztrader s setting . Also, the gen eral ERC model does not r estriet t h e functional form of inequality aver sion in any way. In particular, it is not r estricted t obe linear, nor quadratic, nor symmetric araund equality.
6 A seller j will ship if 50> 70 -r j (70) 2 , or equivalently rj > .004; thus , p = 1 -P(.004) .
explains why the act of buying can be identified as trust in our basic trust game and is not confounded by other motives. By the same token, what has been called trust in other standard trust games studied in the Iiterature m331 have little to do with trust in a reciprocal response. In sequential prisoner's dilemmagames or in the well-known investment game by Berget al. (1995) cooperating, respectively investing, increases efficiency, so that trusting m331 theoretically reflect a concern for efficiency. The following example demonstrates the difficulties of identifying trust w hen the basic game is even only slightly changed: The asymmetric trust game in Figure 3 is the same game as our basic trust game in Figure 2 with the exception that the buyer gets an additional p33fment of 70 regardless of the game outcome. While this small change has no effect on the standard economic analysis based on (marginal) pecuniary incentives, it m331 have a big effect on behavior in a world with fairness. Assurne that some traders care about equitable outcomes as described in the model above. This model predicts that no seller in the asymmetric trust game, regardless of his 'tj, will ever ship, because not shipping maximizes pecuniary outcomes ~nd is equitable. 7 That is, this model predicts that there is no shipping, regardless of the extent to which the seller population is selfish or fair. The interesting point isthat even if he anticipates that there is no shipping, a fair-minded buyer m331 still want to buy. By buying he sacrifices pecuniary payoff in exchange for a fair distribution.
8 In particular, a buyer i prefers to buy if
However, this buying cannot be interpreted as trust in shipping: no seller will ship and all buyers know that. Buying, in the asymmetric trust game of Figure 3 , might, however, be motivated by fairness. Confounding motives for trust like this are largely avoided in the basic trust game.
{b) Procedurm ~pects
• Shipping yields fbr the soller 50-•;(50-120) 2 ; not shipping yields 70 which is ~>.tar fur>.il•; ~ 0.
8 Theso effects ho.w :olro been studied in the oo cilled dicto.tor g>me (soe, e.g., Fbrsythe et >.!. 1991).
Trust necessarily involves the risk of being exploited. An interesting question is whether the risk of a bad outcome is treated differently when it is due to uncertainty of the seller's moraJs or whether it is just determined by a chance move ( e.g., there is alw331s a risk that the i tem is accidentally lest or damaged in the mail). Standard economic theory does not distinguish between different sources of risk when the probabilities for the different states of the world are equivalent. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (forthcoming) demonstrate in an experiment, however, that the risk is perceived differently in a social context than in a non-social context, something that is not captured by any of the social preference models mentioned so far. The game they study is similar to our basic trust game, but the shipping decision is made, not by a seller, but a chance move. The following figure illustrates their game within our simple framework: In their study, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (forthcoming) asked each buyer for the probability a such that he is indifferent between buying and not buying. They also asked each buyer in the basic trust game ( w here the sellers determine the shipping probability a endogenously) which probability of being matched with a trustworthy seller makes him indifferent between buying and not buying. By using an incentive-compatible experimental design, Bohnet and Zeckhauser could compare how much risk buyers are willing to take if the source of the risk is the morals of the sellers, as in the basic trust game, to the amount of risk they are willing to take in a lottery, as in the random-shipping game. In fact, Bohnet and Zeckhauser find that "individuals are much more willing to take risks when the outcome is due to chance, as oppcsed to an equivalent-odds situation where the outcome depends on whether another pl331er proves trustworthy. 'Th.king a chance on the latter risks incurring betr331al ccsts, ccsts shown to be above and beyond mere monetary losses."
A related effect has been observed by Blount (1995) in the context of bargaining games. The same offer was more acceptable to a responder when determined by a lottery than when determined by a(human) proposer. A plausible interpretation for these effects is based on a notion of procedural fairness that has been first put forward and tested by Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2003) . The idea is that an unfair outcome chcsen by a fair lottery is more acceptable than the same unfair outcome chosen by another trader. This notion of procedural fair-ness is not only consistent with Blount's bargaining experiment b ut also with Bohnet and Zeckhauser's trust game study. It is, however, inconsiste nt with both standard economic models and social preference mo dels in behavioral economics that areallinvariant to the fairness of procedures (see, howev er , Bolton et al. 2003 , for a sketch of a model that extends the social u tility a pproach to procedures).
The Nature of Trustworthiness ( a) Distributional aspects
Trust in shipping drives buying. But what drives shipping? As mentioned before, all social motives described so far-fairness, reciprocity and efficiencymay trigger shipping. Herewe examine some empirical ev idence on this issu e.
Let's look first at the basic and the asymmetric trust game in Figures 1 a nd 2. Buying can, for both games, be equally interpreted as 'kind ' behavior and thus, since the seller payoffs are unchanged, reciprocity models wou ld predict no difference of shipping probabilities across the two ga mes.
9
Furt h ermore, observe that efficiency-seeking behavior would also make n o distinction, because a n additional endowment t o the buyer in the asymmetric t r ust game d oes n ot affect the a mount of pote ntial efficiency gains across outcom es. As explained befor e, howev er , fairness m odels predict that while some sellers may b e willing to ship in the basic game, nobody is willing to ship in the asymmet ric game. Thus, while r eciprocity and efficiency models predict no ch ange in seller b ehavior , fairness mod els predict less shipping in the asymmetric t rust gam e.
We studied these gam es in classroom experiments . 10 While in t h e basic t rust game 37 percent of the 30 seller s were willing to ship , in t h e asymm etric t rust game only 7 p ercent shipped (see the numbers in the br ackets in F igures 1 and 2). Thus, the d a ta highly significantly (p < .01) r eject recipr ocity a nd efficien cy as the pred omina nt expla nation of trustworthiness; fai rness, on the ot her h a nd, is la rgely confirmed (though the t wo seller s wh o ship are inconsisten t wit h the fairness motive but consistent with b oth other m otives considered here) .
Inter estingly, even though fa r fewer sellers a re willing to ship in t h e asymme tric gam e, significantly mor e buyers are willing to buy (2 7% in t h e b asic trust ga me and 46% in the asymmetric trust game; p < .05). This suggests t hat fairn ess, and not trust in shipping, is the m ain driver for buying in t h e asym met ric trust ga m e. Similar conclusions about the impact of distr ib utive fairness pr eferen ces in trust a nd r elat ed gam es a r e drawn by a number of oth er ex perimental studies.
11
9 See, for example, B olton and O ckenfels for t h coming. Since the intuition is quite p lau sible, w e w ill make no att empt h er e to go m or e int o the d etails of the r e cipr ocity models ' mechanics , w hich can b e quite complex .
10 In this and the other on e-sh ot experiments , we have thirty independent ob serva tions , r esp ectively , for each choice separa t ely (buying and shipping). E ach su bj ect played only one of the studied games in only one r ole (buyer or seller) . For seller s we app lied the strat egy m ethod, that is each seller wa s ask ed w h eth er h e would ship if the buyer chose to b uy. Half of all en counter s wer e randornly ch osen t o be pa.id ou t according to t h e rules of th e game. A payoff of t en in the game tree translated t o 1 Euro cash .
11 See Bolton /Ockenfels 2000 and forthcoming and the r efer ences cited th er ein. More r e-
{b) Procedwral Mpect
To what extent do sellers condition their behavior on the history of pl331? The following game is the same as the basic trust game with the exception that the buyingdecision is made by arandom procedure rather than by the buyer himself. From the view of distributional fairness and standard economic models, nothing has changed for the seller, who still has exactly the same options over p33foff distributions. From the view of reciprocity models, however, since the buyer has no choice, buying cannot be attributed to the kindness of the buyer, and thus sellers have no reason to be 'kind in response'. In a ciassroom experiment study of the random-buying game, the shipping probabilitywas with 33% only slightly (and not statistically significantly) smaller than in the basic trust game ( Figure 5 ). This indicates that distributional concerns pl33f a major roJe while the history of pl33f, that is 'intentionality' and lottery procedures, only seem to play a minor roJe in determining trustworthiness.
This result too is in line with a number of earlier studies. In particular, the first experimental economics study of distributional versus reciprocity-based preferences in Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) suggested, in the context of a sequential two-players cooperation game similar in the incentive structure as the one we study here, that the second mover's behavior too was invariant to the history of pl33f and to the 'intentions' of the first mover. A number of subsequent studies (e.g., Brandts/Charness forthcoming; Güth et al. 2001) confirmed this invariance property of behavior. Charness and R.abin (2002) distinguish neg~tive reciprocity games, games where other-regarding behavior has a punishment flavor to it (such as ultimaturn and other bargaining games), from positive reciprocity games, games where other-regarding behavior has areward flavor to it (such as dictator and trust games). Attribution-based behavior was found to be significant only in negative reciprocity games (also see Bolton et al. 1998; Offerman 2002) . Some studies conciude that the response to fair or unfair behav ior is substantially invariant (Blount 1995; Dufwenberg et al. 2001 ) or only wea kly sensitive (Charness forthcoming) to wh eth er t he act ion is t aken by a disinterested third party or by the actual game partner. Overall, it seems fair to conclude from the behavioral economics literature that, at least for the kind of trust games that we a r e considering here (positive reciprocity games), distributional fairness is a m ajor motivein virtually all stu dies, while recipr ocit y and intentionality a re sometimes found to be a secondary concern. 12 Summing up, our b asic trust game is an appropriate vehicle to st u dy the motives underlying trust and trustworthiness among online traders. Ther e is no trust without trustworthiness. Trustworthiness a ppears t o be mainly dr iven by d istributive fairness concerns. Risk, a key ingredient of t r ust , is t reated differently according to the procedure by which the uncertainty is r esolved. On the other hand, trustworthiness a ppea rs to b e la rgely invariant to t he history of play (e.g., intentions and lottery pro cedures).
Trust in Repeated Games: Combining B e havioral with Institutional Explanations
In expected mon eta ry terms, the probability of a trustwor thy seller n eeds t o b e a t least 70% in order to m ake buying in t he basic trust game pr ofit able. In none of our on e-shot gam es, was the shipping probability su bstan tially great er than half the r equired a mount. Thus, if trust rests solely on beh avioral propensities, such as social preferences, there is lit tle hope t h at trust among st rangers can be stable. 13 However, when we embed the trust gam e in a repeat ed setting , the inte raction of social behavior wit h institutional design su ch as r eputation mecha nisms can multip ly the impact of the 'truly intrinsic' trustworthiness , b ecause cleverly d esigned instit utions can create strategic incen tives to be trustwort hy even for selfish and rational sellers. In this section we discuss these incentives, rela t e the m to online market platforms a nd study their empirical conten t .
Suppose, for the moment, tha t the sam e seller and the same b uyer play the basic trust game repeatedly, wit h an infinite time h orizon , and so h ave no expectation of a stopping round of p lay. In such a setting, even if all t raders are completely selfish a nd rational, ther e exist equilibria in which the buyer always buys a nd the seller always ships. The equilibria can b e suppor ted b y triggerstrategies that call for a buye r, fo r instance, to trust as long as t h e seller ships. If the seller defects only once, h e w ill never b e t rusted again. If future payoffs a re sufficie ntly important, this gives a n incentive to the seller to be trust worthy all the time, a nd thus for the buyer to trust all the time (K andori 1992). 12 We note that the fact tha t the implementa tion of a lottery affects behav ior in t he rand omshipping game but n ot in t h e random-bu ying game is in line w ith Bolton et aL 's (2003) concept of procedural faimess. In the random-shipping game, an unfair outcome chosen by a fair lottery may b e p er ceived as procedural fair; however, in the random-buying game an unfair out come chosen by the seller c annot be justified as procedural fair w ithin their modeL 1 3 While, of course, payoffs, fra.rn.ing and context are differ ent on computer m ecliated mark et platforms com pared to our simple classr oom game, we believe th at an analogous conclusion also h olds for actual online market platforms.
Ga.ry E. Bolton/Ele= Katok/ A:>!el Ockerifels
There axe, however, two problem:s. with thi:s. kind of simple equilibria in our context. First, the trading horizon in online market platforms i:s. typically finite. If either the buyer or the seller believes that there will be some upper boundaxy of iterns to be traded, cooperation among completely selfish, rational traders will unravel. Second, buying and shipping in infinite game equilibria do not capture trust and trustworthiness because, in equilibrium, there i:s. no uncertainty about each others' behavior; in equilibrium, sellers can have a material incentive to ship, so there i:s. no risk of being exploited. 14 Since thi:s. paper i:s. concerned with trust ( characterized by a ri:s.k of being exploited) in online maxkets (where traders trade a finite number of items), we prefer to study finitely repeated games. In finite games, however, trust may only emerge when there i:s. some (possibly small) amount of 'truly intrinsic' trustworthiness within the seller population (Wil:s.on 1985) .
16 That there i:s. intrinsic trustworthiness has been demonstrated in our experimental studies of the one-shot trust game.
Strangers' Market
Suppose the maxket transactions take place over a series of rounds. At the beginning of each round, a potential buyer i:s. matched with a potential seller and they then pl~ the basic trust game in Figure 2 . In the simplest version of such a repeated setting, each game is pl~ed with a different transaction partner 16 and no information about trade outcomes leaks from one encounter to another one. This market i:s. basically a sequence of one-shot games. Thus, because there is not sufficient intrinsioe trustworthiness to make trust profitable, we hypothesize that all trading activities will collapse. 4 ThE!rE! ~ also mat"Q subtle Qquilibti. a in '\Yhich oooperation in a.ny ~wn roWld is WlCE!rt~n. but, in our view, trust is alro not so.tisf:octorily described o.s >.n equilibrium selection problam.
Sn·anger-seller
15 lf not, ill trust md trustworthiness would unro.wl. We will not m:>ke >.n >t.tempt oo show the det>.ils of the equilil::a'ium o.n:>lysis of trust >.nd trustworthiness in finitely I<!pe>.ted g>mes in >. world with f>.irness. 'Ihe mech>nics of these equilibrio. >.I<! relo.tively complex (see Bolton/Ockenfels 2004 , fbr >. theOI<!tic:>I md e:><periment:>I tl.'<!>t.ment within >. trust g>me environrnent). However, we note her<! tho.t these equilibrio. in f>.ct c>.ptUI<! the risk of being exploited.
l6 In f>.ct, empiric>.l evidence suggests th>..t buyers >.nd sellers on Internet morket plotfunns such o.s eB~ only occ>Sionilly come bo.ck oo the so.me tr>.ding p>..rtner (Rasnick/Zeckh:wser 2002).
In an experiment by Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (forthcoming), we had subjects play in precisely this format, over 30 rounds. N o bu yer met t h e same seller more than once, so we call this experimental treatm ent the Sirangers market. All interaction was computer-mediated a nd anonymous; subjects sat in cubicles in front of computers not knowing the true iden tity of their t rading partners, capturing an importa nt aspect of online trading. The rules and t h at all rounds were actually paid was common knowledge. Figure 6 shows t he average buy ing and shipping (conditioned on buying) behavior over all rou nds.
There is almost the same a mount of trustworthiness as in the one-sh ot version of the trust game in Figure 2 . This reflects that the St rangers market does n ot crea te additional incentives tobe trustworthy as compared to t he one-shot game. On the buyer side, there is, on average, more trust in the St rangers m arket than in the one shot version of the game, p ossibly reflecting t h e h ope t h at r epeated action may support more cooperation. But the dyna m ics reveal t hat buyers respond to the fact that , on average, this expectation was disappointed: They started out by trusting quite a lot but trust quickly collapsed. In fact , the percentage of last round trust was only 0.04%, much less than in the one shotgame, indicating that buying in the one shot game is mainly due to inexperien ce.
Reputation Marke t
From a n economic theory perspective, r eputa tion mech anisms of the sor t we d escribe in the introduction can solve ma ny of the trust prob lems associa ted with t he Internet. In fact, simple theory suggests that information is the key prerequisite to the emergen ce of trust , because it allows buyer s t o avoid sellers w ho a re known as fra udulent a nd to buy only from sellers who h ave been proven to b e t rust worthy in the past. Conditioning trust on the seller's h ist ory creates incentives for sellers to build u p a reputation for b eing t r ustwort h y, at least wh en t he end of the market is not too close and maintaining a good reputation is still valuable. A reputation of b eing trustworthy can b e d eveloped and sustained even by completely rational a nd selfish sellers-as long as the p rob ability of b eing matched w ith intrinsically trustworthy sellers is strictly positive. That intrinsic trustworthiness exists is de monstra ted in our one-shot classroom experime nt and in many oth er experime nts. Tha t it is n ot enough to sustain a trading platform that has n o reputation system , however, is d em onstr ated in our experimental Strangers market. So d oes a feedback system help promoting trust a nd trustworthiness as suggested by theory?
In Bolton et al. (forthcoming) the Stran gers ma rke t was com pared to a R eputation market , pla yed over 30 r ounds, in which, as before, a b uyer never met the same seller more tha n on ce. However, in this market we intr oduced a r epu tation system t hat, similar to eBay's feedback forum, informs buyer s about all past actions of their c urrent seller (see Duffy / Ochs 2003; Bohnet/Ruck fo rt hcom ing, for rela t ed experimental work) . Outside the lab, there a r e a couple of pr oblem s w it h feedback systems having to do w ith the voluntary provision and strategic ma nip ulation of feedback, and m a nipula tion of online identities etc. (see Della rocas forthcoming; Bolton / Katok/Ocke nfels fo rt hcoming b; Ockenfels 2003) .
In our experiments, however, feedbaek on the seller's past behavior is alw~ shared and reliable (beeause it is not given by the buyers themselves but by the experimenter), and sellers had no W9(! to ehange their online identity. This W9(!, the experiment studies the impact of feedback information on trading behavior when an ideal, frietionless reputation meehanism is available. In fact, the shipping probability is slightly higher than the threshold of'rO% for trust being profttable. As a eonsequenee, the trade dy namics too Iook quite different than in the S trangers mar ket; trading starts at about the same Ievel as in the Strangers market but then the Ievel remains stable until the very last rounds, when the strategie value of having a reputation for being trustworthy vanishes and virtually all eooperation eollapses. We eonciude that introdueing a feedbaek system in a market with strangers has a strongly positive impaet on trust, trustworthiness and trading effieiency. Both buyers and sellers respond strategieally to the information provided.
Buyer
Partners Market
The positive impaet of eleetronie reputation meehanisms relative to a Strangers market has also been demonstrated in various fteld studies (see, e.g., Dellaroeas fortheoming, for a reeent survey). However, fteld studies eannot measure trust and trustworthiness on Internet markets relative to offline markets that are typieally eharacterized by repeated interaction between the s~me trading partners.
Theoretieally, offline partners-relationships should oot do better than online markets that implement reputation meehanisms that reliably share all relevant information about the sellers' past behavior. That is, from a theoretieal perspeotive matehing is irrelevant for trust to emerge as long as buyers are suffieiently informed-either through their own experienee or through the experienee of third parties. For the seller to have an ineentive to be trustworthy, he need only expeet that a future buyer will punish or reward his behavior; whether these punishments or rewards eome from the same or from different buyers is irrelevant. The buyer, to induee this trustworthiness, need only be equipped with sufficient information about the sellers' histories; whether this information comes from one's own experience or from different sources is irrelevant. This is the basic message that derives from the game theoretic models: it is the information, not its source or its dissemination, that matters (KreJ:S et al. 1982; Ellison 1994; Bolton/Ockenfels 2004 Our experiment demonstrates that the simple theory is quite misleading when it comes to the impact of matehing and information flows (Figure 8 ). There is substantially and statistically significantly more buying (83 vs. 56 %) and shipping (87 vs. 73 %) in the Partners market than in the Reputation market.
Thus, even an ideal reputation mechanism cannot substitute for a partnersrelationship. n
Conclusions
Normative economic theory, assuming that rationality and selfishness are common knowledge, does not capture trust in our basic game, because there is either never trustworthiness (in a one-shot or finitely repeated version of the trust game) or there is no risk in 'trusting' (in simple equilibria of the infinitely repeated game). This all changes w hen traders are allowed to have social preferences. Then, uncertainty about one's seller morals opens the door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building-even in the one-shot basic trust game, but especially in the ( finitely) repeated game.
In our experiments, sellers' intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. 'nanslated to Internet market platforrns, it seems likely that eB~ or Amazon's market ,. As we exphinin Bolton et >l. farthooming. this is beco.use o.feedbock mechanismexhibits >. kind af public gpods problern in th:>t, unlike in the p:>rtnsrs m:>rket, the benafits af trust md trustworthy beho.vior gp 1o the whol<! cammuniw md :>re not co~letely intem:ilized.
for used books would quickly collapse without a reputation system. On t he other hand, a reputation system without any individual social concerns cannot work either. If no seller would ever ship in a one-shot encounter, and if this were common knowledge among buyers, any cooperation would unravel, because the promise of being trustworthy will always be broken. H owever, clever institutional design multiplies the positive impact of 'truly intrinsic' t r ustworthiness that exists even without such systems. It is the interaction of social pr eferences and reputation mechanisms that solves to a large extent the t r ust problern on Internet market platforms. The strategic aspects of this interaction is in important parts captured by modern behavioral economics.
At the same time, equilibrium theory and social preference models tend to underestimate the difficulties of promoting trust in anon ym ous online trading communities. For one, in one-shot games, economic theory d oes not ca ptu re the observation that the source of risk, independent of its stochastic properties, affects behavior. In terms of our basic trust game, the p rocedure by which the uncertainty of whether the item is shipped or not is resolved is critical for the buyers' decision to trust--even if the objective risk parameters are t he same. The risk of being exploited by an untrustworthy seller makes buyers more cautious than (the same) risk that the item is accidentally lost by t h e postm an. As a consequence, the trust problern is more severe tha n m odels of r ational r isk b eh avior would suggest.
Simila rly, in re peated gam es, the role of information as provided b y electronic reputa tion mechanisms is overrated by theory and the role of matehing underrated. Information proble ms can theoretically b e solved by a ppropriate information dissemination, but, in fact , the matehing scheme limits what can be maximally reached in anonymous online trade communities. Econom ic theory does not capture the observation tha t the source of information, indep end en t of its content, affects behavior. As a consequence, trust problems are m ore severe tha n models of rational processing of information would suggest.
We think these results suggest that a satisfactory exp lanation of trust and trustworthiness in Inte rnet markets w ill r equire a modelthat grapples with both the mixed motives of the traders a nd how these motives inter-p lay wit h the institutional d esign of the ma rke t. In our exp erimental markets, t rad in g behaviortrust a nd trustworthy b eh avior included-is clearly strategic but n evertheless differs in important w ays from existing strategic m od els. By the same token, a ny m odel tha t assumes tha t trust and trustwort hy behavior is entirely a matter of social n orm s or morality w ill probably be una ble to capture t h e important b ehav ioral resp onse traders have to other traders str at egic op tions as w ell as their own.
